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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a civil rights action arising out of the shooting of 
a pet dog. The plaintiffs/appellants are Kim and David 
Brown, the owners of the pet. Police Officer Robert Eberly 
is alleged to be the primary constitutional tortfeasor. Officer 
Eberly's employer, Muhlenberg Township, its Board of 
Supervisors, and two of its Chiefs of Police are also alleged 
to be responsible for Officer Eberly's constitutional torts on 
various theories. Additionally, the Browns assert a state law 
claim. The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on all claims. 
 
We first address the facts and law concerning whether a 
constitutional violation occurred. We then examine whether 
the defendants other than Officer Eberly share 
responsibility for any constitutional violations that may 
have occurred. Finally, we focus on the state law claim. 
Because this case comes to us on appeal from the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the Browns, 
drawing every reasonable inference in their favor. See 
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The Browns lived in a residential section of Reading, 
Pennsylvania. On the morning of April 28, 1998, they were 
in the process of moving. Kim was upstairs packing, while 
David was loading the car. Immi, their three year old 
Rottweiler pet, had been placed in the Browns' fenced yard. 
Although the Browns had not secured a dog license for her, 
Immi wore a bright pink, one inch wide collar with many 
tags: her rabies tag, her microchip tag, a guardian angel 
tag, an identification tag with the Browns' address and 
telephone number, and the Browns' prior Rottweiler's 
lifetime license. Unbeknownst to the Browns, the latch on 
the back gate of their fence had failed, and Immi had 
wandered into the adjacent parking lot beyond the fence. 
 
                                3 
  
A stranger parked in the lot observed Immi as she 
wandered about in it. After three or four minutes of sniffing 
and casually walking near the fence, Immi approached the 
sidewalk along the street on which the Browns lived. As she 
reached the curb, Officer Eberly was passing in his patrol 
car. Seeing Immi, he pulled over, parked across the street, 
and approached her. He clapped his hands and called to 
her. Immi barked several times and then withdrew, circling 
around a vehicle in the parking lot that was approximately 
twenty feet from the curb. Having crossed the street and 
entered the parking lot, Officer Eberly walked to a position 
ten to twelve feet from Immi. Immi was stationary and not 
growling or barking. According to the stranger observing 
from his car, Immi "did not display any aggressive behavior 
towards [Officer Eberly] and never tried to attack him." 
 
At this point, Kim Brown looked out of an open, screened 
window of her house. She saw Officer Eberly not more than 
fifty feet away. He and Immi were facing one another. 
Officer Eberly reached for his gun. Kim screamed as loudly 
as she could, "That's my dog, don't shoot!" Her husband 
heard her and came running from the back of the house. 
Officer Eberly hesitated a few seconds and then pointed his 
gun at Immi. Kim tried to break through the window's 
screen and screamed, "No!" 
 
Officer Eberly then fired five shots at Immi. Immi fell to 
the ground immediately after the first shot, and Officer 
Eberly continued firing as she tried to crawl away. One 
bullet entered Immi's right mid-neck region; three or four 
bullets entered Immi's hind end. 
 
Immi had lived with the Browns pre-school aged children 
for most of her three years and had not previously been 
violent or aggressive towards anyone. 
 
Based on these facts and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from them, we are thus faced with a situation 
in which a municipal law enforcement officer intentionally 
and repeatedly shot a pet without any provocation and with 
knowledge that it belonged to the family who lived in the 
adjacent house and was available to take custody. 
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II. OFFICER EBERLY 
 
A. Unreasonable Seizure 
 
The Browns claim that Officer Eberly violated their 
constitutionally secured right to be free from unreasonable 
governmental seizures of their property. The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." The 
people's "effects" include their personal property. See United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (detention of 
luggage held to be a Fourth Amendment seizure). A Fourth 
Amendment "seizure" of personal property occurs when 
"there is some meaningful interference with an individual's 
possessory interests in that property." United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Destroying property 
meaningfully interferes with an individual's possessory 
interest in that property. See id. at 124-25. "[T]he 
destruction of property by state officials poses as much of 
a threat, if not more, to people's right to be `secure . . . in 
their effects' as does the physical taking of them." Fuller v. 
Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
The Browns had a possessory interest in their pet. In 
Pennsylvania, by statute, "All dogs are . . . declared to be 
personal property and subjects of theft." 3 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 459-601(a). See Miller v. Peraino , 626 A.2d 637, 640 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864 
n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).1 It necessarily follows that Immi 
was property protected by the Fourth Amendment and that 
Officer Eberly's destruction of her constituted a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. Accordingly, we join two of our sister 
courts of appeals in holding that the killing of a person's 
dog by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Officer Eberly argues that an unlicensed dog under Pennsylvania law 
is as a matter of law an abandoned dog. We find no authority for this 
proposition and, accepting the evidence tendered by the Browns, are 
unpersuaded that Immi should be regarded as having been abandoned. 
 
                                5 
  
under the Fourth Amendment. Fuller, 36 F.3d at 68; Lesher 
v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150-51 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 
To be constitutionally permissible, then, Officer Eberly's 
seizure must have been "reasonable." "In the ordinary case, 
the [Supreme] Court has viewed a seizure of personal 
property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to 
a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and 
particularly describing the items to be seized." Place, 462 
U.S. at 701. Where the governmental interest justifying a 
seizure is sufficiently compelling and the nature and extent 
of the intrusion occasioned by the seizure is not 
disproportionate to that interest, the seizure may be 
reasonable even though effected without a warrant. Thus, 
when the state claims a right to make a warrantless 
seizure, we "must balance the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 
against the importance of the governmental interests 
alleged to justify the intrusion." Id. at 703. Even when the 
state's interest is sufficiently compelling to justify a 
warrantless seizure that is minimally intrusive, the seizure 
will be unreasonable if it is disproportionately intrusive. 
While the state's interest in drug interdiction, for example, 
is sufficient to render reasonable a brief but warrantless 
detention of suspicious luggage for a canine "sniff," such 
detention for ninety minutes constitutes an unreasonable 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
 
Where a pet is found at large, the state undoubtedly has 
an interest in restraining it so that it will pose no danger to 
the person or property of others. The dog catcher thus does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment when he or she takes a 
stray into custody. Moreover, the state's interest in 
protecting life and property may be implicated when there 
is reason to believe the pet poses an imminent danger.2 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The state's interest in the protection of life and property undoubtedly 
occasioned enactment of 3 P.S. S 459-302(a) which states in relevant 
part: 
 
       It shall be the duty of every police officer, State dog warden, 
       employee of the department or animal control officer to seize and 
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the latter case, the state's interest may even justify the 
extreme intrusion occasioned by the destruction of the pet 
in the owner's presence.3 This does not mean, however, that 
the state may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, 
destroy a pet when it poses no immediate danger and the 
owner is looking on, obviously desirous of retaining 
custody. Striking the balance required by Place , we hold 
that Officer Eberly's destruction of Immi could be found to 
be an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
This brings us to Officer Eberly's qualified immunity 
defense. Qualified immunity absolves Officer Eberly from 
liability and, indeed, from the burdens of defending this 
suit, if he can show that a reasonable officer with the 
information he possessed at the time could have believed 
that his conduct was lawful in light of the law that was 
clearly established on April 28, 1998. Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). In order for a right to be 
"clearly established," the "contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 
640. While "[t]his is not to say that an official's action is 
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in 
question has previously been held unlawful, . . . it is to say 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       detain any dog which is found running at large, either upon the 
       public streets or highways of the Commonwealth, or upon the 
       property of a person other than the owner of such dog, and 
       unaccompanied by the owner. Every police officer, State dog warden, 
       employee of the department or animal control officer may humanely 
       kill any dog which is found running at large and is deemed after 
due 
       consideration by the police officer, State dog warden, employee of 
       the department or animal control officer to constitute a threat to 
the 
       public health and welfare. 
 
While Officer Eberly relies on this statute, it would be clearly 
inapposite 
should the trier of fact credit the evidence that has been tendered by the 
Browns. 
 
3. See Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (contrasting the degree of intrusion when 
a seizure of personal effects is made "after the owner has relinquished 
control of the property to a third party [and when the seizure is] from 
the 
immediate custody and control of the owner"). 
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that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must 
be apparent." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
As we have previously noted, the Supreme Court's 1984 
decision in United States v. Jacobson reaffirmed the well 
established proposition that a Fourth Amendment seizure 
of property occurs whenever there is some meaningful 
intrusion with an individual's possessory interest in that 
property and that destruction of property thus constitutes 
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, we 
believe that, at least after the enactment of 3 P.S.S 459-601 
in 1983, a reasonable law enforcement officer in Officer 
Eberly's position would have realized that a person's dog is 
his personal property under Pennsylvania law. Finally, we 
believe that, based on Place and the cases there reviewed, 
a reasonable officer would have understood that it was 
unlawful for him to destroy a citizen's personal property in 
the absence of a substantial public interest that would be 
served by the destruction. 
 
If the facts asserted by the Browns are found to be true, 
we conclude that a reasonable officer in Officer Eberly's 
position could not have applied these well established 
principles to the situation before him and have concluded 
that he could lawfully destroy a pet who posed no imminent 
danger and whose owners were known, available, and 
desirous of assuming custody.4 In other words, it would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. If the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct would have been 
apparent to a reasonable official based on the current state of the law, 
it is not necessary that there be binding precedent from this circuit so 
advising. As we explained in Pro v. Donatucci , 81 F.3d 1282, 1292 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted): 
 
       In Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d at 1459, we noted that "the absence of 
       a previous decision from our court on the constitutionality of the 
       conduct at issue is not dispositive" in determining whether the 
       particular constitutional right at issue was clearly established at 
a 
       particular time, and stated that the standard "require[s] `some but 
       not precise factual correspondence between relevant precedents and 
       the conduct at issue,' " id. (citing In re City of Philadelphia 
Litig., 49 
       F.3d at 970) in order to be satisfied. Moreover, Bieregu found law 
to 
       be clearly established despite a circuit split, as long as "no 
gaping 
       divide has emerged in the jurisprudence such that defendants could 
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have been apparent to a reasonable officer that shooting 
Immi would be unlawful. Accordingly, Officer Eberly has 
not established that he is entitled to qualified immunity.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       reasonably expect this circuit to rule" to the contrary. 59 F.3d at 
       1458-59. Thus, the split between the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth 
       and the Fourth Circuits at the time of Donatucci's actions does not 
       preclude our deciding that Pro's right to respond to the subpoena 
       was clearly established. 
 
In this case, the only court of appeals decisions addressing the relevant 
issue, Fuller and Lesher, had reached the conclusion that the state's 
killing of a person's dog without a public interest justification 
constituted 
a Fourth Amendment violation. That unavoidable conclusion was 
reached based on a common sense application of the Supreme Court 
precedent we have discussed. 
 
Doe v. Delie, 2001 WL 817680 (3d Cir., July 19, 2001), holds only that 
conflicting and materially distinguishable district court decisions did 
not 
render a right clearly established in the Third Circuit. 
 
5. There is no question but that evidence currently in the record would 
support findings of fact under which there would be no Fourth 
Amendment violation, and Officer Eberly would be entitled to qualified 
immunity in any event. That is not the issue before us, however. If there 
is evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that a 
constitutional 
violation occurred and that a reasonable officer would have known based 
on clearly established law that he was violating the Browns' rights, 
summary judgment was inappropriate. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304 (1995). 
 
Despite its protestations to the contrary, the dissent does not accept 
the record evidence in the light most favorable to the Browns and draw 
all reasonable inferences in their favor. Contrary to the assertions of 
the 
dissent, Officer Eberly's testimony that Immi was acting aggressively 
before the shooting and that he did not hear Kim Brown claim ownership 
before he shot is not undisputed. Kim Brown's testimony would support 
a finding that there was no provocation for the shooting, as would the 
testimony of the disinterested observer in the parking lot. With respect 
to Officer Eberly's knowledge that the dog's owner was available and 
anxious to take custody, Russell Yoder, a neighbor of the Browns, gave 
the following testimony: 
 
       Q. And what did you hear? 
 
       A. Okay. The things that I heard -- the first thing was, I heard a 
       woman starting to shout and she was shouting, Don't shoot, don't 
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B. Procedural Due Process 
 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not 
deprive a citizen of his property without affording him due 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       shoot. . . . I really couldn't see anything there. But then I heard 
-- 
       I heard her say, That's my dog, that's my dog, don't shoot. So all 
of 
       a sudden, right after that there were five shots that just -- they 
just 
       went bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, and I -- I got down on 
       the -- behind my door `cause I didn't know where these shots were 
       coming from, . . . . 
 
App. at 449-450. 
 
The District Court was not free to ignore this sworn testimony given 
before the Civil Service Commission. It was the equivalent of an affidavit 
and while it technically may have been hearsay, so too are affidavits. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires only that "supporting and 
opposing [sworn statements] be made on personal knowledge, . . . set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and . . . show that 
the [declarant] is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
The 
transcript of Yoder's sworn testimony satisfies all three of these 
requirements. See also Williams v. Borough of West Chester Pa., 891 
F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding, on the authority of Celotex v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317 (1986), that "hearsay evidence produced in a affidavit 
opposing summary judgment may be considered if the out-of-court 
declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony, 
i.e., 
`in a form that would be admissible at trial.' ") (quoting from Celotex, 
891 
F.2d at 466, n.6). 
 
Moreover, ignoring Yoder's testimony would not change the result. Kim 
Brown testified that when she yelled Officer Eberly was in close 
proximity and hesitated in apparent response to her shout before 
shooting. Her testimony would clearly support a finding that Officer 
Eberly was on notice of the Browns' ownership and availability before he 
shot. On cross examination, for example, she testified as follows: 
 
       Q. And you believe that you yelled something out? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. But you don't know what you yelled? 
 
       A. I believe the first thing I said was, "That's my dog." I'm 
almost 
       positive. 
 
       Q. You say you're almost positive. Does that mean you know that 
       you did that or you're not sure? 
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process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1. Property 
interests created by state law are protected under that 
amendment, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972), and destruction of such property by the state 
constitutes a "deprivation" thereof, see Parratt v. Taylor, 
451 U.S. 527 (1981). It follows that Officer Eberly's 
destruction of Immi deprived the Browns of their property 
and that they were entitled to due process. See id. 
 
Usually, the process that is constitutionally "due" must 
be afforded before the deprivation occurs -- the state must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A. Not one hundred percent sure. 
 
       Q. What percentage would you give to that? 
 
       A. Ninety percent. 
 
       Q. Why do you have any doubt as to what you yelled? 
 
       A. I don't know what order I said everything in. Again, it happened 
       so fast. 
 
       Q. How long after you yelled something did the shooting start? 
 
       A. A few seconds. I thought he hesitated. 
 
       Q. What led you to believe that he hesitated? 
 
       A. There seemed to be quite a few seconds that elapsed between 
       me seeing his arm move and seeing the actual gun. 
 
* * * 
 
       Q. Do you know whether or not he heard you yelling? 
 
       A. I don't know what he heard. 
 
       Q. You don't know whether he heard you yelling, right? 
 
       A. No. I don't know what he heard. 
 
       Q. Nothing that you saw or witnessed gave you the impression one 
       way or the other whether he heard you yell? 
 
       A. Yes. He hesitated. 
 
       Q. What do you mean by hesitated, what hesitated? 
 
       A. His arm stopped moving for a few seconds. I saw it moving, it 
       stopped, then he brought the gun out. 
 App. at 106-07; App. at 108. 
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provide predeprivation process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 
U.S. 113, 127 (1990). When the complained of conduct is 
"random and unauthorized" (so that state authorities 
cannot predict when such unsanctioned deprivations will 
occur), however, the "very nature of the deprivation ma[kes] 
predeprivation process impossible." Id. at 137. In such 
situations, postdeprivation process is all that is due. See id. 
 
Contrary to the Browns' suggestion, we conclude that no 
predeprivation process was constitutionally required here. 
In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), a prison guard 
was alleged to have intentionally destroyed noncontraband 
personal property of an inmate while conducting an 
authorized "shakedown" of his cell. The inmate claimed that 
this constituted a deprivation of property without due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court held that no predeprivation process 
was required and that the state's provision of a 
postdeprivation remedy in the form of a suit for damages 
provided all the process that was due. With respect to 
predeprivation process, the Court found that the guard's 
destruction of the property was the "random and 
unauthorized conduct of a state employee" and that 
"predeprivation procedures [were] simply`impracticable.' " 
Id. at 533. The inmate, like the Browns, argued that the 
state's agent (there, the guard; here, Officer Eberly) could 
have provided predeprivation process and was, therefore, 
constitutionally required to do so. Rejecting this contention, 
the Court observed: 
 
       Whether an individual employee himself is able to 
       foresee a deprivation is simply of no consequence. The 
       controlling inquiry is solely whether the state is in a 
       position to provide for predeprivation process. 
 
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534. There is no material distinction 
between the Browns' case and Hudson. 
 
Hudson is also helpful with respect to the sufficiency of 
the postdeprivation process provided to the Browns by 
Pennsylvania. At oral argument, the Browns acknowledged 
that Pennsylvania afforded them a judicial remedy: a civil 
action for conversion. Like the inmate in Hudson , however, 
they argue that their state remedy was inadequate because 
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the state-employed tortfeasor was protected by sovereign 
immunity. This argument fails for the same reason it failed 
in Hudson. Pennsylvania law, like the state law in Hudson, 
deprives public employees of immunity for intentional torts. 
Section 8550 of Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort 
Claim Act denies immunity to any public employee when 
the court finds that his or her conduct constitutes, among 
other things, "willful misconduct." "Willful misconduct" in 
this context "has the same meaning as the term`intentional 
tort.' " Delate v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1995); see also Kuzel v. Krause, 658 A.2d 856, 859 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1995). Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Browns, they were afforded postdeprivation 
judicial process by the law of Pennsylvania, and such 
process was all that was due. Summary judgment was 
properly entered against the Browns on their procedural 
due process claim. 
 
Because the civil rights act liability of the remaining 
defendants is predicated on there being a constitutional 
violation committed by Officer Eberly, we will hereafter 
confine our discussion to civil rights liability in connection 
with the possible Fourth Amendment violation.6 
 
III. THE TOWNSHIP AND ITS SUPERVISORS 
 
Regardless of the nature of underlying right alleged to 
have been aggrieved, Muhlenberg Township and its Board 
of Supervisors can be liable for any constitutional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At the conclusion of the argument section of the Browns' brief devoted 
to their procedural due process argument, they assert in conclusory 
fashion that Officer Eberly's conduct also violated their right to 
substantive due process. Because of the cursory treatment of this 
contention, we do not regard a substantive due process issue as properly 
before us. We note, however, that "not all property interests worthy of 
procedural due process protections are protected by the concept of 
substantive due process." Reich v. Beharry , 883 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 
1989). We know of no authority which clearly establishes that one in the 
Browns' position has been deprived of a property interest of the "quality" 
required for substantive due process protection. DeBlasio v. Zoning Board 
of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, if we were 
to assume a substantive due process violation, Officer Eberly would be 
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 
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deprivations suffered by the Browns only if "there is a direct 
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the 
alleged constitutional deprivation." City of Canton v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).7 A direct causal link can be 
shown in two ways. First, "a body [such as Muhlenberg 
Township or its Board of Supervisors] may . . . be sued 
directly if it is alleged to have caused a constitutional tort 
through `a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 
officers.' " City of Saint Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 
121 (quoting Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,690 
(1978)). Second, the Browns could establish the requisite 
causal link between the constitutional deprivation and a 
custom, "even though such a custom has not received 
formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking 
channels." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A"custom, or usage, 
of [a] State" for S 1983 purposes"must have the force of law 
by virtue of the persistent practices of state officials." 
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167 (1970). In 
either event, the municipality's liability can be predicated 
"only [upon] acts for which the municipality itself is 
actually responsible . . . ." Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123. 
"[O]nly those municipal officials who have`final 
policymaking authority' may by their actions subject the 
government to S 1983 liability." Id.  (quoting Pembaur v. City 
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). 
 
The official policy or adopted custom that subjects a 
municipality to S 1983 liability may relate to the training of 
police officers. A municipality's failure to train its police 
officers can subject it to liability, however, "only where [it] 
reflects a `deliberate' or `conscious' choice by [the] 
municipality -- a `policy' as defined" in Supreme Court 
cases. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Moreover, such 
liability arises "only where the failure to train amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom 
the police come into contact." Id. The scope of failure to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The requirement that liability rest on a direct causal link between the 
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation 
precludes respondeat-superior liability. See Monell v. Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 690, 691 (1978). 
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train liability is a narrow one. As the Supreme Court has 
explained: 
 
       It may seem contrary to common sense to assert that 
       a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking 
       reasonable steps to train its employees. But it may 
       happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific 
       officers or employees the need for more or different 
       training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to 
       result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the 
       policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have 
       been deliberately indifferent to the need. 
 
Id. at 390. 
 
The Browns have not satisfied their burden of 
establishing facts sufficient to support their claim of 
municipal liability. They have tendered no evidence of any 
official policy endorsing Officer Eberly's conduct. Indeed, 
the Township's policy manual spells out a progressive use 
of force policy relating to animals that is inconsistent with 
Officer Eberly's conduct. The policy states the"[t]he degree 
of force [the officer should use] is dependent upon the facts 
surrounding the situation the officer faces. Only a 
reasonable and necessary amount of force will be used." 
The policy authorizes the use of chemical agents, such as 
oleoresin capsicum (or "pepper") spray, "for defensive 
purposes." The policy explicitly states that"[t]his weapon 
may also be used against attacking dogs . . . ." The policy 
specifically addressed the use of firearms against animals: 
 
       An officer may use a firearm to kill a dangerous animal 
       or terminate the suffering of a critically injured or sick 
       animal when other means of disposal are impractical. 
       Whenever possible, the owner of the animal to be 
       destroyed shall be contacted and written permission 
       obtained. In the event the owner cannot be located, the 
       identification of any available witnesses who will attest 
       to the need to destroy the animal will be recorded by 
       the officer. In any case, whenever the shooting of an 
       animal is necessary, the shooting must be done 
       cautiously to protect and [sic] nearby persons or 
       property. 
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Nor have the Browns established the existence of an 
unconstitutional governmental custom. They argue, in 
essence, that Muhlenberg Township and its Board of 
Supervisors customarily condoned a practice of employing 
excessive force in handling dogs at large. The record, 
however, simply will not support an inference that there 
was a pattern of such excessive force, much less that the 
Board customarily condoned it. 
 
The Browns' evidence also falls far short of establishing 
their failure to train claim. To survive summary judgment 
on a failure to train theory, the Browns must present 
evidence that the need for more or different training was so 
obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of 
constitutional rights that the policymaker's failure to 
respond amounts to deliberate indifference. City of Canton, 
489 U.S. at 390. While it is true that Muhlenberg police 
officers received no formal training specifically directed to 
handling dogs, they did have the guidance of the policy 
manual, and we believe a reasonable trier of fact could not 
conclude that the need for further guidance was so obvious 
as to indicate deliberate indifference on the part of the 
Board to the Browns' constitutional rights. 
 
IV. POLICE CHIEFS FLANAGAN AND SMITH 
 
The Browns also allege that Police Chief Robert Flanagan 
and Police Chief Harley Smith are responsible for Officer 
Eberly's constitutional torts. Their argument is not that 
Chief Flanagan or Chief Smith directed Officer Eberly to 
deprive the Browns of any constitutionally protected right. 
Rather, the Browns focus on the alleged inadequacy of the 
Chiefs' supervision. 
 
In Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989), 
this court identified the elements of a supervisory liability 
claim. The plaintiff must (1) identify the specific supervisory 
practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, 
and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without 
the identified, absent custom or procedure created an 
unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor 
was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the 
supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the 
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underling's violation resulted from the supervisor's failure 
to employ that supervisory practice or procedure. We 
emphasized that "it is not enough for a plaintiff to argue 
that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have 
occurred if the superior had done more than he or she did." 
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118. Rather, the plaintiff must 
identify specific acts or omissions of the supervisor that 
evidence deliberate indifference and persuade the court that 
there is a "relationship between the `identified deficiency' 
and the `ultimate injury.' " Id. 
 
These elements have not been satisfied with respect to 
either Chief of Police. As to Chief Smith, the Browns have 
offered no explanation as to how he could be responsible 
for a shooting that occurred almost two years after he 
retired. As to Chief Flanagan, the Browns have identified 
two supervisory practices or procedures he allegedly failed 
to employ. The first -- that he failed to train Muhlenberg 
police officers on the proper use of force against animals -- 
must be rejected for the same reason we rejected the 
similar claim against the Board of Supervisors. The policy 
manual in effect at the time of the shooting gave 
instructions on how to handle situations of this kind, and 
a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that the failure 
to provide more formal training evidenced deliberate 
indifference. 
 
The Browns' second theory is that Chief Flanagan must 
have been aware of Officer Eberly's alleged practice of using 
excessive force against animals and nevertheless failed to 
take appropriate disciplinary action. There is no evidence 
that Chief Flanagan had knowledge of any prior excessive 
use of force on animals by Officer Eberly, however. Nor is 
there any evidence of a pattern of excessive use of such 
force by Eberly which would support a finding that Chief 
Flanagan should have been aware that Eberly posed a 
threat in situations like the one in question. While Officer 
Eberly acknowledged during his deposition that he had 
killed dogs on four prior occasions during his sixteen year 
career, only one of the incidents he recounted produced a 
complaint, and the uncontradicted evidence with respect to 
the others reveals nothing comparable to the Browns' 
version of the facts in the case at bar. In two of these 
 
                                17 
  
incidents, the dog charged either Eberly or a fellow officer. 
In the third, a stray dog had been terrorizing the 
neighborhood and extended, unsuccessful efforts had been 
made to catch it. The only incident that generated a 
complaint about excessive use of force by Officer Eberly 
against a dog occurred in approximately 1988, some ten 
years before the incident giving rise to this suit and more 
than eight years before Chief Flanagan assumed office on 
July 15, 1996. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of both Chief Flanagan and Chief Smith. 
 
V. THE STATE LAW CLAIM 
 
The Browns claim that they are entitled to recover from 
Officer Eberly for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 
They emphasize that a reasonable trier of fact could 
conclude that Officer Eberly, without any justification 
whatsoever, shot Immi five times in front of her owner, 
deliberately ignoring the fact that the owner was screaming 
in protest and pleading with him not to shoot. They also 
point to evidence indicating that the experience of observing 
the slaughter of her beloved pet exacerbated Kim's pre- 
existing post traumatic stress disorder, leaving her with 
nightmares, headaches, and severe anxiety. 
 
In Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1989), we 
predicted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would 
recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts S 46 
(1965). We have found no Pennsylvania case since that time 
which alters this view. Section 46 provides in relevant part:9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Browns argue in their brief that Chiefs Flanagan and Smith are 
not entitled to sovereign immunity under Pennsylvania law. They do not 
indicate, however, what state tort claim against them was improperly 
rejected by the District Court and we cannot hypothesize one that the 
record would support. We thus address only the Browns' intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim which is directed only towards 
Officer Eberly. 
 
9. Subsection (2) of Section 46 provides as follows: 
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       (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
       intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
       distress to another is subject to liability for such 
       emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
       results from it, for such bodily harm. 
 
Accordingly, the elements that the Browns must satisfy 
are (1) that Officer Eberly's conduct was extreme and 
outrageous, (2) that his conduct caused a person severe 
emotional distress, and (3) that he acted intending to cause 
that person such distress or with knowledge that such 
distress was substantially certain to occur.10 As we have 
indicated, the record would clearly support a finding that 
Officer Eberly intended to inflict, or knew he would inflict, 
severe emotional distress on Kim Brown. Moreover, Officer 
Eberly does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
tendered by the Browns concerning severe emotional 
distress. This leaves the issue of whether the courts of 
Pennsylvania would permit a trier of fact to conclude that 
Officer Eberly's conduct was extreme and outrageous. 
According to the Restatement commentary, conduct is 
sufficient to make out a claim for emotional distress if "the 
recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is 
       subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe 
       emotional distress 
 
       (a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present 
       at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, 
       or 
 
       (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such 
distress 
       results in bodily harm. 
 
Contrary to the suggestion of the amicus, we are not persuaded that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would regard this subsection as having 
any relevance here. 
 
10. See Comment (i) to S 46 providing in relevant part: 
 
       The rule stated in this Section applies where the actor desires to 
       inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that 
such 
       distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his 
       conduct. 
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community would arouse his resentment against the actor, 
and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!' " Restatement 
(Second) of Torts S 46, cmt. d. 
 
One Pennsylvania case has recognized an emotional 
distress claim in a situation like ours. In Banasczek v. 
Kowalski, No. 9009 of 1978, 1979 WL 489 (C.P. Luzerne 
County Jan. 30, 1979), the plaintiff asserted a claim for 
emotional distress stemming from the defendant's shooting 
of two of the plaintiff 's dogs. In what appears to have been 
a case of first impression in Pennsylvania, the court in 
Banasczek held that Pennsylvania recognized the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress generally and 
then, following the authority of cases from Texas and 
Florida, concluded that "the more enlightened view is to 
allow recovery for emotional distress in the instance of the 
malicious destruction of a pet . . . ." Id.  at *2. 
 
Officer Eberly argues in essence that the killing of a pet 
under any circumstances would not be recognized by the 
Pennsylvania courts as extreme or outrageous. We believe 
the Banasczek court was correct in rejecting a similar 
contention. Given the strength of community sentiment 
against at least extreme forms of animal abuse and the 
substantial emotional investment that pet owners 
frequently make in their pets, we would not expect the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to rule out all liability 
predicated on the killing of a pet. 
 
More specifically, we predict that the Pennsylvania courts 
would permit a trier of fact to return a verdict for the 
plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
case where it is shown that a police officer's attention was 
called to the severe emotional distress of the pet's owner, he 
hesitated before shooting, and he then attempted to fire five 
bullets into the pet within the owner's view and without 
justification. In such cases, the malicious behavior is 
directed to the owner as well as to the pet, with the 
potential for serious emotional injury to the owner being 
readily apparent. In the relatively few cases where similar 
issues have arisen in other jurisdictions, the prevailing view 
is consistent with the one we take. See Nelson v. Percy, 540 
A.2d 1035, 1036 (Vt. 1987); Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star 
Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985); LaPorte v. 
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Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964); 
Katsaris v. Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1985); City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12, 17 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963) 
 
We find ourselves in disagreement with Officer Eberly's 
reading of Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988), and Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993), two Pennsylvania cases involving the death of a pet 
in which recovery pursuant to section 46 was denied. 
Daughen holds that a veterinarian's negligent operation on 
a family pet, without more, was not extreme and 
outrageous conduct for purposes of section 46. 
 
Miller stands for the proposition that the defendant must 
have intentionally caused a person severe emotional 
distress. The vicious beating of the family dog in Miller, if 
proven at trial, would by all accounts have been extreme 
and outrageous, and we do not read the court in Miller to 
disagree. Rather, the Miller plaintiffs failed to allege, much 
less produce evidence, that the tortfeasor's heinous acts 
against the dog were performed with the intention of 
inflicting severe emotional distress on the dog's owners. 
This is not so in the case at bar, where the Browns have 
produced evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that Officer Eberly shot Immi either 
intending to cause Kim Brown severe emotional distress or 
with the knowledge that the infliction of such distress on 
her would be virtually certain. 
 
Officer Eberly is not entitled to sovereign immunity under 
state law with respect to the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim because the record will support a 
conclusion that he acted intentionally.11  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We agree with the District Court that Officer Eberly was entitled to 
summary judgment with respect to David Brown's intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim. The record indicates that he did not witness 
the shooting and would not support a finding that Officer Eberly was 
even aware of his existence. 
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VI. 
 
The judgment of the District Court in favor of all 
defendants except Officer Eberly will be affirmed. The 
judgment in favor of Officer Eberly will be reversed, and the 
case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting and concurring: 
 
The issue that has divided this panel and which should 
concern every judge, every police officer and every official 
who claims qualified immunity by virtue of his or her office 
is: how do we determine the second prong of the qualified 
immunity doctrine -- i.e., when is the constitutional right 
which is claimed to have been violated clearly established 
so as to visit liability on the official? 
 
Distressingly, the majority opinion fails to announce a 
standard by which the bench and the bar can test whether 
a particular legal principle -- that is the particular 
constitutional right -- is "clearly established" for purposes 
of qualified immunity. I strongly urge that in deciding this 
second prong, at the least a balancing process should be 
undertaken whereby the factors to be balanced are: 
 
       (1) Was the particular right which was alleged to have 
       been violated specifically defined, or did it have to 
       be constructed or gleaned from analogous general 
       precepts? See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 605 
       (1999). 
 
       (2) Has that particular right ever been discussed or 
       announced by either the Supreme Court or by this 
       Circuit? 
 
       (3) If neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has 
       pronounced such a right, have there been 
       persuasive appellate decisions of other circuit 
       courts -- and by that I mean more than just one 
       or two -- so that the particular right could be said 
       to be known generally? 
 
       (4) Were the circumstances under which such a right 
       was announced of the nature that an official who 
       claimed qualified immunity would have, acting 
       objectively under pre-existing law, reasonably 
       understood that his act or conduct was unlawful? 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Second Circuit has at least crafted a standard against which the 
second prong of the qualified immunity analysis can be tested. That 
standard is similar to the one I have just suggested. See Horne v. 
Coughin, 155 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Tested by these factors, it is clear to me that Officer 
Eberly, when he shot and killed the Brown's Rottweiler 
which was unleashed, uncontrolled, barking and presenting 
an aggressive appearance, could not have reasonably 
understood that his act was unlawful. As such, he is 
entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
 
I 
 
I concede that it is not an easy task to determine when 
a right is clearly established. The precedents (with some 
exception), measured by the standard outlined above, 
would agree that breaking into a home without a warrant 
would offend Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, that 
right is clearly established. Similarly, the precedents would 
agree that inducing a coerced confession violates a 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Accordingly, that right 
is clearly established. By the same token, the precedents 
would agree that torturing a prison inmate violates the 
Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, that right is clearly 
established. But -- I do not know of any precedent or any 
judge, other than the members of the majority, who can 
responsibly hold that even if the Fourth Amendment is 
violated by a police officer shooting an unleashed, 
uncontrolled, barking Rottweiler which, as I point out in 
note 4 (infra), is an aggressive and possibly threatening 
large animal (certainly not a pussycat!), that such a right, 
if there is one, has been clearly established  in any 
jurisdiction, let alone in this Circuit. 
 
A. Specifically Defined 
 
Can it really be held that the Fourth Amendment"seizure 
of property" right was readily and generally known to apply 
to the shooting of a Rottweiler which was loose on the 
street? Can we really say that this particular Fourth 
Amendment principle was defined with particular specificity 
and was therefore clearly established for purposes of 
qualified immunity? I am aware of no authority which 
defines the principle with sufficient particularity so as to 
make it applicable to the situation here. 
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B. Lack of Binding Precedent 
 
Can we really hold that the decisional law of the Supreme 
Court and this Court effectively equates the two concepts 
discussed above? Or -- that Fourth Amendment principles 
of either court have at any time been applied to the 
shooting of an animal such as the Brown's Rottweiler under 
the circumstances faced by Officer Eberly? The majority 
has furnished us with no such authority and I know of 
none. 
 
C. Absence of Out-of-Circuit Authority 
 
Well then, can we look at other appellate decisions that 
are relevant -- if not on-point, at least near the point -- 
and which are persuasive? As I explain later in referring to 
Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150 (8th Cir. 1994), and Fuller 
v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994) (see  text at 31-32, 
infra), neither of those cases is relevant, neither case is on- 
point, neither case involves the same circumstances, and 
neither case can be applied here in the context of Officer 
Eberly's actions. Needless to say, neither case is 
persuasive. 
 
D. Pre-Existing Law 
 
Are there then cases under pre-existing law which would 
have or should have been known to Eberly, leading to his 
reasonable understanding that by shooting the dog which 
confronted him, he was doing something unlawful? If there 
are such cases, we have not been informed of them by the 
majority and I have not been able to find any. 
 
II 
 
In determining whether a legal principle is "clearly 
established," if we cannot look to state law, as we cannot, 
see Doe v. Delie, 2001 WL 817680 (3d Cir. July 19, 2001) 
("officials do not forfeit qualified immunity from suit for 
violation of a federal constitutional right because they failed 
to comply with a clear state statute.") (citations omitted), 
and we cannot look to district court opinions or to other 
circuit pronouncements even if they are relevant (and those 
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cited by the majority are not, see text at 31-32, infra), id., 
and we in the Third Circuit have never addressed this issue 
in the present context, then how can we possibly expect a 
police officer such as Eberly to understand that he would 
be violating a right that has never been specifically defined, 
let alone clearly established, in this or any other 
jurisdiction. As the majority opinion points out, citing to 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 638 (1987), the"contours 
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right." Id. at 640; maj. op. at 7. That is to say that "in 
light of preexisting law, the unlawfulness must be 
apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. How has the 
unlawful conduct of Officer Eberly, if indeed it was 
unlawful, been shown by the majority to be "apparent?" It 
is no answer, nor is it sufficient, to proclaim ipse dixit, as 
the majority has, "that Officer Eberly has not established 
that he is entitled to qualified immunity." Maj. op. at 9. 
 
The relevant focus has to be on the final part of the 
qualified immunity inquiry -- whether the right allegedly 
violated was clearly established so that a reasonable official 
in Eberly's position would understand that what he was 
doing violated that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. If 
there has never been a constitutional right articulated that 
would prevent a police officer from shooting a barking, 
unleashed, uncontrolled dog such as the Rottweiler which 
was killed -- as there has not been in this jurisdiction or 
any others -- how can the absence of such a right as 
postulated by the majority constitute a clearly established 
right so as to hold Eberly liable? 
 
In my opinion, the majority has erred in its unanalytic 
resolution of this issue, and its resolution should be 
rejected because it makes bad law in this case and in 
future cases where the clearly established element must be 
decided. Because there is no standard announced other 
than the one I have advanced, and there is no basis or 
authority supporting the "clearly established" holding of the 
majority, in my opinion, its holding here will dilute -- if not 
destroy -- the essential clearly established  element 
announced by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800 (1982) and explained in Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
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Here, because the record establishes that Officer Eberly 
was qualifiedly immune when he shot the Browns' 
Rottweiler, I would affirm the District Court's judgment. 
Eberly's immunity springs from the fact that even assuming 
a Fourth Amendment violation -- an assumption bearing 
many serious concerns and one that carries a great deal of 
baggage under the circumstances here -- there was no 
clearly established constitutional right that Eberly violated 
to warrant holding him liable -- any more than there was 
a clearly established right that the majority concedes 
immunizes Eberly from the Brown's substantive due 
process claim. See maj. op at 13, n. 6. 2 
 
Moreover, recognizing that in the qualified immunity 
context, the determination of whether Eberly's actions were 
reasonable in the face of conflicting evidence can only be 
made by resort to affidavit and testimony supporting the 
Browns' position, I conclude that Eberly's actions were not 
only objectively reasonable for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, but did not, and could not, constitute an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I have assumed that a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred for 
purposes of this case. I point out, however, that the District Court 
adverted to the dog being abandoned, undoubtedly because it was 
unleashed, out on the street, under no control of an owner, and was 
barking at a police officer. Inasmuch as an element of the Fourth 
Amendment violation requires a determination of being unreasonable 
which may fall within the jury's purview but which is a decision which 
could not be rendered by a jury if qualified immunity attached, because 
the grant of qualified immunity would preclude a trial being held, I point 
out no more than that the issue of a Fourth Amendment violation in the 
case of an unleashed, uncontrolled Rottweiler barking at a police officer 
on a public street leaves much to be desired in the way of satisfying the 
strictures of a Fourth Amendment seizure, and is completely 
distinguishable from Fuller v. Vines, 26 F.3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that plaintiffs stated a Fourth Amendment violation in alleging that 
police officers killed plaintiffs' dog in the plaintiff 's yard) and 
Lesher v. 
Reed, 12 F.3d 148 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that police officers' removal 
of a dog from inside plaintiffs' home fits "within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment"). 
 
                                27 
  
III 
 
Pennsylvania law provides that "It shall be the duty of 
every police officer or state dog warden to seize and detain 
any licensed dog which is found running at large , either 
upon the public streets or highways of the Commonwealth, 
or upon the property of a person other than the owner of 
such dog, and unaccompanied by the owner or keeper." 3 
P.S. S 459-302 (emphasis added). By statute it is provided 
that "Every police officer or state dog warden may kill any 
dog which is found running at large and is deemed after 
due consideration by the police officer or state dog warden 
to constitute a threat to the public health and welfare." 3 
P.S. S 459-303 (emphasis added). Officer Eberly testified: 
"Because of the way [s]he was barking and growling at me, 
I perceived [her] as a threat to me, but I had a 
responsibility to do something to get this dog into custody 
as a police officer. That's part of my responsibility for stray 
dogs." A-394. 
 
IV 
 
Let me amplify my earlier analysis explaining the second 
prong -- the clearly established prong-- of the qualified 
immunity doctrine. Government officials "are shielded from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 
457 U.S. at 818; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986) (observing that "all but the plainly incompetent 
or those who knowingly violate the law" are protected by 
qualified immunity). Whether a government official 
asserting qualified immunity may be held personally liable 
for conduct that allegedly violated a constitutional or 
statutory right depends on the "objective legal 
reasonableness" of the action. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 639 (1987). As the Court explained, and as I have 
stated above: 
 
       The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that 
       a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
       doing violates that right. This is not to say that an 
       official action is protected by qualified immunity unless 
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       the very action in question has been previously held 
       unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre- 
       existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
 
Id. 
 
The Supreme Court has admonished that the particular 
right at issue must be defined with specificity."[W]hat 
`clearly established' means in this context depends largely 
upon the level of generality at which the relevant legal rule 
is to be identified." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 605, 614 
(1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted)."It could 
plausibly be asserted that any violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is `clearly established,' since it is clearly 
established that the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
apply to the actions of police. . . . However, . . . the right 
allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of 
specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly 
established." Id. at 615 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). The Court in Wilson held that bringing the media 
into a private home to film the execution of a warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment, but held that the right was 
not clearly established to warrant finding the officers liable 
for damages. The Court defined the specificity of the right 
as follows: "the appropriate question is objective inquiry of 
whether a reasonable officer could have believed that 
bringing members of the media into a home during the 
execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly 
established law and the information the officers possessed." 
Id. 
 
In the present case, the appropriate question is whether 
Officer Eberly as a reasonable officer could have perceived 
that the Rottweiler which was unleashed, uncontrolled, and 
running free on a public way and was barking at him, was 
a threat to him or to the public health and welfare. If so, as 
I believe all reasonable persons would agree, then his 
shooting the unleashed, uncontrolled and barking 
Rottweiler was lawful. 
 
As I have indicated, I am willing to assume a Fourth 
Amendment constitutional right (see n. 2, supra), but 
contrary to the majority, I cannot say that Eberly's conduct 
in shooting an unleashed Rottweiler which any reasonable 
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person would perceive as threatening and which was under 
the control of no owner and was barking, is clearly 
established as a constitutional violation in the Third 
Circuit. To the contrary, as I have earlier stated and as the 
majority must agree, my research has not revealed any 
Third Circuit precedent involving a police officer or other 
official who has ever been held liable or non-immune as a 
result of shooting an uncontrolled animal running freely on 
the public highway and which was perceived as being a 
threat to the public safety or to the officer. Nor have I found 
any out-of-circuit precedent that could be deemed as 
constituting clearly-established law and which could be 
said to have informed Officer Eberly that in shooting the 
Rottweiler he was violating the Browns' Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
 
In my view, even if non-circuit precedents existed, which 
they do not, such precedents are non-binding decisions 
which do not "clearly establish" law for purposes of 
qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has not defined the 
level of precedent required to render a right " clearly 
established." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n. 32 ("we need not 
define here the circumstances under which the state of the 
law should be evaluated by reference to the opinions of this 
Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District."). 
 
Several courts, and most importantly the Third Circuit, 
have held that non-binding precedent does not make a 
right "clearly established." See Doe v. Delie, 2001 WL 
817680 (3d Cir. July 19, 2001) (holding that district court 
decisions did not render a right clearly established in the 
Third Circuit); Hansen v. Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 578 
n. 6 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "the case law of one 
other circuit cannot settle the law in this circuit to the 
point of it being `clearly established.' "); Knight v. Mills, 836 
F.2d 659, 668 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that decisions by two 
other circuits cannot create clearly established law when 
the Supreme Court had reserved the issue); Ohio Civ. Serv. 
Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 
1988) (concluding that decisions of other circuits clearly 
establish the law only if they "both point unmistakably to 
the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and 
[are] so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority 
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as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that 
his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would 
be found wanting."). 
 
In Doe v. Delie, 2001 WL 817680 (3d Cir. July 19, 2001), 
which found a constitutional right of privacy of a prison 
inmate's medical information (a decision which I 
questioned, see id. (Garth, J., dissenting), but then 
appropriately found that there was no clearly established 
right that was violated (a decision with which I agreed), we 
held that neither state nor out-of-circuit precedents could 
satisfy the clearly established element of the immunity 
doctrine. We did so because there was no authority to 
which we could look in any jurisdiction, including our own, 
whereby a prison official would understand that by 
prescribing a medication so that others might hear the 
prescription, the prisoner's right to privacy had been 
violated. Just so here, where even if the Brown's claimed 
constitutional right was confirmed, the majority opinion has 
not substantiated that it would have been apparent to a 
reasonable officer -- in the circumstances present when the 
Brown's Rottweiler confronted Eberly -- that shooting the 
Rottweiler would be unlawful. 
 
Indeed, the only decisional law in our sister circuits is 
decisional law by the Eighth Circuit (Lesher) and by the 
Ninth Circuit (Fuller) involving dogs seized within the 
property of their respective owners -- a far cry from an 
unleashed dog on the public street out of its owners' 
control. These cases do not render the law clearly 
established in either the Eighth or Ninth Circuits, to say 
nothing of my own Circuit -- the Third. Thus Officer Eberly 
is entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
In Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150 (8th Cir. 1994), the 
government officials "removed [plaintiffs'] dog from their 
home." Similarly, in Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65 (9th Cir. 
1994), the police officers killed plaintiffs' dog in the 
plaintiff 's yard. In neither case were the dogs running free 
and uncontrolled and in neither case was there a 
perception of a threat to the public safety. Here, in 
contrast, the Browns' Rottweiler was outside their control, 
outside the Browns' property, and unleashed and barking 
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on the public street giving every appearance of a threat to 
public safety. 
 
Officer Eberly saw the Browns' Rottweiler running free 
without a leash obstructing traffic on Madison Avenue in 
Muhlenberg. Eberly parked his police car, exited, walked 
toward the dog and clapped his hands and called to her. 
The Rottweiler then barked at Eberly. One witness, 
Christopher Grim, testified that the Rottweiler"was getting 
ugly with the officer. . . . It was showing its teeth and 
barking and growling and it had -- it was po[i]sed, back 
end dip position . . . . I don't know if you've ever noticed 
when dogs get really like wild or violent they come and they 
bear down on their back legs in kind of a striking-type 
thing." A-432. Eberly testified: 
 
       The dog at that point, as it came around the back[of 
       a parked car], came towards me, barking and growling 
       and, again, put his feet forward and took a stance and 
       took like a, he was protecting, whatever, stance. At 
       that point the dog went back on his hind legs and 
       came forward off his hind legs, and it looked like the 
       dog was going to attack me from how he sprang 
       forward. At that time I though he was coming for me. 
       When he came off his back legs and came towards me, 
       I raised my weapon and fired. 
 
A-396-97; see also Eberly's Testimony, A-406 (explaining 
that "she rocked back and forth on her hind legs and 
started to come forward. It looked like, from my experience, 
this dog was lunging and going to attack me."). Eberly shot 
five times, hitting the Rottweiler three or four times.3 
 
Even disregarding Eberly's and Grim's testimony, and 
viewing the facts, as I must, in the light most favorable to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In a later part of this dissent, I have criticized the majority for 
having 
relied upon the testimony of Russell Yoder, which does not satisfy the 
requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) and which is therefore 
inadmissible hearsay. It may well be that Grim's testimony suffers from 
the same failing, in which case I should not consider it any more than 
Yoder's testimony. Accordingly, I have disregarded not only Grim's 
testimony, but also the testimony of Officer Eberly, since we are bound 
on summary judgment to view all of the evidence and to credit all of the 
inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. 
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the Browns, Eberly's actions were objectively reasonable. It 
is uncontested that the dog was a Rottweiler,4 that it was 
unleashed and uncontrolled, and that it had been barking. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Surprisingly, the majority opinion has failed to inform the reader 
about the characteristics and nature of a Rottweiler that should be taken 
into consideration in assessing the reasonableness of Eberly's actions. 
While the record does not disclose this information, we can take judicial 
notice of these traits from the American Kennel Club's descriptions 
(www.akc.org) and the American Rottweiler Club's"Introducing the 
Rottweiler" (www.amrottclub.org). 
 
The American Rottweiler Club describes a Rottweiler as "a robust, 
powerful and loyal breed. . . . He is an outstanding companion and 
guard but ownership of a Rottweiler carries much greater than average 
legal and moral responsibilities, due to traits possessed by this breed, 
their size and strength. . . . Males range from 24" to 27" at the shoulder 
and 95-135 lbs in weight. Females are somewhat smaller, 22" to 25" tall 
and 80 to 100 lbs." 
 
"The Rottweiler is very strong for its size. It has been used in Europe 
to pull carts and retains the compact musculature desirable in a draft 
animal. A full grown adult can easily knock a human off his feet. . . . 
Obedience training is a must because of the animal's size and strength; 
you must be able to maintain complete control of your animal at all 
times. . . . [Aggressiveness] varies with the individual dog to some 
degree, 
although all have a strong territorial instinct and will defend their 
master's home, car and property from intruders. Rottweilers have also 
been known to bully or bluff their owners or other people, a trait that is 
most disconcerting. . . . Although the Rottweiler does not usually bite 
without provocation, even being cornered and held by one of these dogs 
is a very unnerving experience for meter men, delivery persons or 
neighbors wandering into the yard while the owner is absent." American 
Rottweiler Club, "Introducing the Rottweiler." 
 
The American Kennel Club states, "[t]he ideal Rottweiler is a medium 
large, robust and powerful dog. . . . His compact and substantial build 
denotes great strength, agility and endurance. Dogs are characteristically 
more massive throughout with larger frame and heavier bone than 
bitches. . . . Dogs [range from] 24 inches to 27 inches. Bitches [range 
from] 22 inches to 25 inches." 
 
Although it is sad to learn of the death or injury of any pet, I cannot 
overlook the apprehension that an individual -- particularly a police 
officer, who has a duty to protect and ensure the safety of the public -- 
may have when faced with an unleashed, uncontrolled, barking 
Rottweiler. 
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Nothing in the record establishes the majority's conclusions 
that Eberly knew the family to whom the dog belonged, that 
the Browns owned the dog and lived in an adjacent house, 
or that the Browns were available to take the Rottweiler in 
custody. Nor can the record be read to show that Eberly 
shot the Rottweiler without any provocation. See  Maj. Op. 
at 4. Moreover, Eberly's testimony that he heard and saw 
no one before shooting is also not disputed. Contrary to the 
majority's statement of facts, Ms. Brown's testimony 
concerning when and what she shouted to Eberly is both 
ambiguous and equivocal. She did not state that when the 
officer reached for his gun, she shouted "That's my dog, 
don't shoot!" Maj. Op. at 4. Rather, referring to what Ms. 
Brown herself testified to, these are the operative facts: 
 
       Q: So you saw his right arm move and you yelled 
       something? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: What did you yell? 
 
       A: At that point I'm not exactly sure what I yelled. I 
       know once he started shooting I know what I 
       yelled. I just started screaming. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q: You don't know what you yelled? 
 
       A: I believe it was, "That's my dog," but I'm not 
       positive. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q: As you sit here today, do you know what you 
       yelled? 
 
       A: I don't know in order. I know that words must have 
       come out of my mouth, but I don't know for certain 
       what I said. 
 
A-104-06 (emphasis added). 
 
Because Ms. Brown did not know what she said and 
when she said it, reliance cannot be had on her testimony 
as related in the majority opinion. All we can glean from the 
record is that at some point in time after Eberly fired at the 
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Rottweiler, she started screaming. But we cannot know 
what she said and at what point she claimed the Rottweiler 
as hers. Moreover, in light of the record which I have just 
reproduced above, it cannot be said that Eberly heard 
anything until after he had fired his weapon.5 
 
In particular, I stress that the majority's conclusion that 
Ms. Brown claimed ownership of the dog prior to the 
shooting -- because it depends so heavily on Yoder's 
testimony -- is flawed and inaccurate. Let me explain why. 
 
The majority opinion in its extensive footnote 5, in an 
effort to bolster its conclusion that Eberly knew that the 
Rottweiler's owner was available and anxious to take 
custody, unfortunately recites testimony which was not 
available for consideration by the District Court. It is by no 
means available for consideration by us, and should not be 
relied upon in the majority opinion because the testimony 
of Russell Yoder was taken in connection with a Civil 
Service Commission Hearing, and is inadmissible into 
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). 
 
That Rule requires such testimony, in order to be 
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, to be 
accompanied by proof (1) that the declarant -- in this case 
Yoder -- was unavailable to testify, (2) that the testimony 
was taken at a hearing, deposition, civil action or 
proceeding, and (3) that the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered -- in this case Eberly-- had an 
opportunity to test the testimony by examination. New 
Jersey Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 197 F.3d 
96, 110 (3d Cir. 1999); Kirk v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 61 
F.3d 147, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Here, Yoder's testimony was taken before a Civil Service 
Commission with nothing appearing in the record to 
establish his availability or unavailability in the instant 
proceeding, nor can we tell from the record, by which we 
are bound, whether the Commission Hearing -- not a court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although in the qualified immunity summary judgment context we 
could not rely upon Eberly's testimony if it was disputed, here no one 
can contest Eberly's statement made in his deposition that "[a]fter the 
shooting, that's when I heard voices." 
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proceeding -- satisfied the other elements of the Rule so as 
to permit consideration in this summary judgment 
proceeding. See New Jersey Turnpike, 197 F.3d at 110. Nor 
is the majority opinion's explanation and its citations to 
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pennsylvania , 891 
F.2d 458, 466 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1990) and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) an answer to Yoder's 
unavailability. Williams, referring to Celotex, is no more 
than dictum, while Celotex refers only to appropriate 
admissible affidavits or depositions, neither of which appear 
in the instant record other than through Yoder's 
administrative testimony. Hence by any evidentiary test, 
Yoder's prior testimony before an administrative tribunal 
was not admissible for consideration here because Yoder 
must be considered "available" on this record where it is 
undisputed that there is no finding to that effect. 
 
Indeed, the District Court judge did not, so far as I can 
tell, rely on that evidence in any particular and it has only 
been resurrected by the majority on this appeal so as to 
shore up its conclusion that Eberly should be liable. It 
would have been an abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to have admitted and considered this testimony 
without a finding of unavailability, see Kirk , 61 F.3d at 165, 
and the burden of proof of unavailability, as well as the 
other elements of Rule 804(b)(1), rests upon the proponents 
of the testimony -- here, the Browns. An examination of the 
record reveals that it is completely silent as to Yoder's 
availability. Hence, it is inappropriate -- indeed it is error 
-- for the majority to rely on inadmissible hearsay 
testimony whose reliability has not been tested. Without 
Yoder's testimony -- testimony which the majority opinion 
relies upon so heavily -- the majority's conclusion simply 
cannot stand. 
 
V 
 
It is crystal clear to me that even in the face of a Fourth 
Amendment violation, which as I have noted may be 
problematical, see n.1, supra, Eberly's conduct as a police 
officer in discharge of his statutory duty was not only 
appropriate but no clearly established constitutional right 
stemming from the occurrence of his shooting the Browns' 
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dog would or could have been known to any reasonable 
person. Unfortunately, the majority opinion has not seen fit 
to announce a standard for clearly established  doctrine in 
the context of qualified immunity, and by failing to do so, 
it obviously could not relate the actions of Officer Eberly to 
an unarticulated standard. Thus, by this failure, it has 
abdicated this Court's responsibility to balance"the 
interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and 
in public officials' effective performance of their duties." 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (internal quotations omitted), 
and has made it impossible for officials within our 
jurisdiction to reasonably anticipate when their conduct 
may give rise to liability for damages. 
 
Because I cannot join such an opinion which disregards 
the content of an acknowledged doctrine, I would affirm, in 
its entirety, the District Court's judgment of May 22, 2000 
which granted summary judgment for Officer Eberly and 
the other named defendants.6 To the extent that the 
majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For largely the same reasons discussed above, I would also hold -- as 
I stated earlier -- that Eberly's conduct, based solely on the record 
supporting the Browns' position, could not constitute an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
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